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The assassination of President Kennedy gave rise within a week
to a theory of how it had been accomplished. Lee Oswald had a gun
like one which was in the hands of the Dallas police as early as the
day following the assassination. 1 He was placed at a spot on the sixth
1 Specialists, of whom there are now a considerable number, will recognize that this
statement is somewhat tendentious. The Report says that the Dallas police "released" the
gun they had found to the FBI at 11:45 p.m. on November 22, the day of the assassination. The rifle was examined in Washington "on the morning" of November 23.
This observation will remind the reader of the inevitable defects of any review, particularly a review by a nonspecialist. Selection has been inevitable. The specialists will
note the absence from the discussion of the gun of any reference to the palm print or
the fibers, and there is no reference at any point to the paraffin tests whose significance
has been subject to steadily increasing discount.
These omissions represent a judgment that these materials have little significance. This
judgment is, of course, subject to dispute. By way of compensation, materials on which
this judgment is partly based have not been discussed or even enumerated.
There are, for example, a considerable number of features of the story which seem to
warrant a healthy skepticism in dealing with information furnished only by the Dallas
police. There is, for example, the Dallas police readiness to identify the remnants of
the chicken luncheon with Oswald's position before the shooting, together with a similarly vulnerable report that a map allegedly found in Oswald's room had crosses which
indicated a plan for the assassination. There is still a question whether Oswald had time
to go from the room where the shots are thought to have been fired to the room where
he was first seen after the assassination, and to appear then unwinded and soon after, at
least, with a coke. There is even a question whether the time needed to wipe fingerprints from the gun would not have critically diminished the period needed for his trip
from one room to another.
The palm print which was "lifted" from the gun and sent to the FBI in Washington
so that it arrived on November 29 is conspicuous both by its history and by its uniqueness, though it is doubtless somewhat more significant than the fibers or the paraffin test.
It will be noticed from the start that a reader has not the facilities of either a detective or a juryman. It may be that one who saw and heard the Dallas police testifying
would have become either more or less skeptical about their testimony than one is as a
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floor of a building, where three empty shells suitable for the gun
were reported found, along the course which President Kennedy traveled, in such a position that he could have fired at the President. He
reader only. It must be constantly remembered that the safeguards of an ordinary criminal trial were not, and perhaps could not be, provided for in the hearings or the other
procedures of the Commission.
Some readers may wish to compare my treatment of this case with my treatment elsewhere of some other controversial cases of our times. I have expressed an unfavorable
view of the judgment in the Sacco-Vanzetti cases, which has been affected in the interval
only slightly and not determinatively by the publication of Mr. Russell's interesting book,
Tragedy in Dedham (1962). See 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 399 (1961). In the same essay I expressed unfavorable views about the judgments in the Mooney-Billings cases, the Hiss
case, and the Rosen berg-Sobell cases. My opinion about the Rosenberg-Sobell cases has
been strengthened by the publication of Walter and Miriam Schneirs' Invitation to an
Inquest. See my review in the Progressive for January, 1966, at page 40. As I am of
counsel for Mr. Sobell in a pending motion, I cannot appropriately discuss this case
further, except to say that the motion papers now of public record furnish material, in
addition to that in the Schneirs' book, which seems to be of possible interest to historians. On the Hiss case, some of the Committee cases, and particularly the Smith Act
cases, see further my review of Packer, Ex-Communist Witnesses, in 61 MIcH. L. REv.
209 (1962). The comments in the essay review first cited have been further supplemented
by developments in the Anastaplo case and by the application of doctrines related to
Mr. Anastaplo's doctrines expressed in the Schware case and in the related and significant
case of Shuffling Sam. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); cf. Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
For a somewhat problematical application of this group of doctrines, see Garnerv. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). Mr. Anastaplo's position seems now to have received further vindication in the New York teacher's case. Keyushian v. Board of Regents, 35 L.W. 4152 (1967).
These cases provide the most effective available legal safeguards against the return of a
period like the one associated with the theoretical enormities of the loyalty proceedings
of the 1950's. They also indicate the extent to which reactions that one is tempted to
call paranoiac (not paranoid) may appear under the influence of domestic or international
tensions and may in turn contribute to enhancing those tensions.
These cases seem to me for at least four reasons somewhat more readily subject to a
useful and decisive judgment than does the Oswald case. First, in these cases issues were
to some extent framed and witnesses tested by cross-examination. Second, the problem of
Oswald is complicated by an unusually high proportion of evidence which is itself physical or which relates to physical processes. Not only would it be useful to examine exhibits, as it is impracticable for the stay-at-home reviewer to do, but it would presumably
be necessary in the end to have those exhibits explained by someone specially equipped
to understand them. In the third place, the complicated and various motivations of various law enforcement officers present a peculiar problem in the Oswald case. As far as
one can judge from the printed records, some of the Dallas police force, for example,
appear to be more conscientious than others. The motivations for the Dallas police force,
and for the FBI and Secret Service as well, to convict someone must have been very
strong. Not only was the victim of the murder the President of the United States, but in
what was treated as a related sequence, a member of the Dallas police force was another
victim. The normal tendency to find someone to punish must have been particularly
strengthened by the circumstances of this case. In the fourth place, so far as one can
sort out what appears to be relatively dependable evidence on both sides of the Oswald
case, each side appears to have a case nearly as persuasive as the other, more so than
seems to be the case with the other proceedings which I have discussed in print.
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was identified by some witnesses as the man who, soon after the President's assassination, murdered a Dallas policeman; and he was arrested
in a movie theater not far from where the policeman was killed.
Within the week skeptical reporters had observed difficulties with this
official theory. Oswald's record for marksmanship in the Marines was
not such as to qualify him for such shots with the kind of rifle in
question, as the theory required. The only vivid and conceivably
spontaneous testimony to the identity of the killer of the policeman
described a person markedly different from Oswald as the killer. The
circumstances of the arrest cannot be reconstructed today from eyewitness accounts of the event. The murder of Oswald by Ruby has
made it more difficult than it might have been to understand the entire
story. The President's Commission did its best.
Now its Report and published criticism and discussion, particularly
the three books here considered, make possible a more thorough examination of the events. We shall consider first what seems the critical
evidence, about whose nature Report and books are not in any simple
collision, though they differ in their conclusions.
The principal addition to the evidence against Oswald made by the
Report is in an account of the discovery of a bullet in the hospital
to which the President was taken, which is said to show that it came
from the gun which the Dallas police had as early as the day after
the assassination. The principal new evidence against the theory of
Oswald's guilt, or at least the theory that he was solely guilty, is a
difficulty resulting from an amateur movie film of the shooting of the
President and the wounding of Governor Connally of Texas, who
was riding ahead of him in the same car. The movie apparently
(though not perhaps indisputably) shows that it would not simply
have been extraordinary marksmanship to fire two bullets as rapidly
as separate shots and hits of the President and Connally would have
required, but that it would have been physically impossible to do so
with the rifle in question. The result of this film was a one shot-two
hit hypothesis about a first shot which wounded both the President
and Connally. (A later shot killed the President.) The one shot-two
hit hypothesis creates such serious difficulties that it is now a center
of controversy about the Report. It is important because if it took two
shots for these two hits, it means that someone in addition to Oswald
must have been shooting; and the moment that step is taken the official view of the assassination becomes subject to a great range of
doubts, including some increase in existing doubts as to whether
Oswald did any of the shooting at all. Participation with another assas-
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sin is inconsistent with the characterization of Oswald and with every
critical feature of the narrative in the Commission's Report. Moreover,
it indicates incentives and opportunities for framing which are without
any definable limits.
When our doubts are explored, what seems most certain is seen
as questionable. Perhaps the most dependable evidence against Oswald
is a pair of photographs, of one of which there is a negative said not
to have been retouched. It shows him holding a gun like the one to
which Dallas police called attention on the day following the assassination.
The identification of this gun as the murder weapon, which at first
seemed so well established, is seen now to be doubtful. An order for
the gun, thought to be in Oswald's handwriting and leading to an
identifying serial number on a gun like that in the hands of the Dallas
police with the same serial number, appeared at first to be strong
evidence against Oswald. The gun was ordered and shipped in March,
before anyone thinks Oswald planned any assassination; and it was
ordered to be sent to Oswald's post office box in Dallas but addressed
to a man named as "Hidell." It was thought at first that this was a fictitious name, but a Marine Corps acquaintance of Oswald's, Heindel,
living in New Orleans, has made an affidavit stating that he was commonly known by way of nickname as "Hidell." Part of Oswald's Dallas
post office box application, designed to record authorization for delivery to others than the box holder, was reported destroyed by the post
office authorities before the expiration of the two years which regulations required it to be kept. Unneeded cards, apparently signed in
the name of "Hidell," were reported by the Dallas police on the day
following the assassination to have been found in Oswald's billfold;
but a police participant had already said that on his arrest the only
clue to Oswald's identity which the billfold revealed was his own
name, "Lee H. Oswald."
Marina Oswald, Lee Oswald's widow, said that the gun she was
shown was the gun that Oswald owned. Her testimony, given under the
influence of a desire to please, seems on all points unreliable. On this
point it is a simple and untested assertion.
If Oswald owned and once possessed the gun in question, there is
no evidence that he ever bought any ammunition for it or that he ever
practiced shooting with it or used it unless it was for taking the shot
at General Walker as to which Marina Oswald gave typically unreliable testimony. Attempts were made to find a source of ammunition,
but these attempts failed.
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If Oswald owned and once possessed the rifle, the evidence offered
to show that he had it with him in the building at the time at which
and at the point from which he is supposed to have fired it has become
subject to the greatest doubt. Testimony that he had a package with
him when he came to work the morning of the assassination now seems
to indicate that the package was of such a size that it could not have
contained the gun either assembled or disassembled. If it is thought
to have contained a disassembled gun, it is now recognized that the
time which witnesses leave for Oswald to assemble it was brief.
Moreover, the gun which the police first announced they had found
at the supposed place of the crime was apparently a German gun of
larger caliber than the Italian gun which Oswald is thought to have had
and which was like the one which the Dallas police said on the following day that they had. There is, moreover, what is said to be a rather
arresting, or at least clear, mark on the Italian gun giving its caliber,
with another mark indicating that it was made in Italy.
The identification of the murder weapon as belonging to Oswald
and in his possession at the time of the crime is thus seen to be problematical. It is the strongest evidence there is against Oswald, but the
supporting testimony surely would have been subject to the most vigorous cross-examination at a true trial of Oswald for the assassination
of the President.
The next strongest evidence is the single whole bullet found in the
Parkland Hospital in Dallas. Fragments of a bullet were found by the
FBI in the President's limousine after its return to Washington immediately after the assassination; and these fragments are said to have
indicated that the Italian gun must have fired them. There appears,
however, to be grave doubt whether such fragments can afford a satisfactory basis for identifying the gun, and here again the absence of
cross-examination makes it impossible to know how far the two experts who testified on the matter were willing to go in supporting
their opinion.
The one whole bullet, said to be slightly flattened or deformed,
found in the hospital is another matter. So far as one can judge by
simply reading books and Report, there is no sufficient reason to doubt
that this bullet was fired from the gun which was in the hands of the
Dallas police by the Saturday following the Friday assassination. One
familiar with the problems raised by the fatal bullet in the SaccoVanzetti ca,,- knows also that the switching of bullets is a familiar
device, and one must wonder about the sources and custody of the
bullet in question. The first report was that it came from President
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Kennedy's stretcher, and the second that it came from Governor
Connally's stretcher. The man who found it, however, an engineer
employed by the hospital, has stood fast by this testimony that it came
from a third stretcher taken down from the floor where Governor Connally's stretcher had been to a lower floor where the bullet somehow
fell out from under a mat. Once a second participant in the shooting is thought to be required by the sequence of shots, the opportunities for planting both gun and bullet are seen to be indeterminate.
The person who found the bullet gave it to the Secret Service, and it
may be that its custody from then on was irreproachable.
The gun and the bullet are between them quite strong evidence
against Oswald. The problems about the shots are, however, so serious
as to make it seem very doubtful, as far as one can judge from reading,
that Oswald was the sole murderer; and if he was not the sole murderer
the presence of another participant reduces our understanding of what
went on to such an extent that one cannot feel confident that Oswald
2
was involved at all.

2 Professor Bickel in his article in the October Commentary has emphasized two points.
First, he has shown some favor to a view of the sequence of shots which was persuasively
rejected by the Commission. Second, he has been influenced by the tear in the front of
the President's shirt, and perhaps by a nick in the necktie, to a much greater extent than
was the Commission. The ultimate fatal shot may, it appears, have displaced portions of
the President's brain and resulted in fragmentation of both bullet and brain in such a
way as to leave obscure the significance of these marks. A clarification of the meaning of
the autopsy and of the meaning of the receiving doctors' first observations will be necessary to put these clothing marks in perspective. If one observes the caution of the Commission on these matters, one will be given further occasion for reflection. It may be that
the Commission has underestimated the significance of the circumstances here in question.
On the other hand, it appears to have been subject to a prosecutor's bias, if any; and that
circumstance increases the significance of what appears to be its caution here.
Mr. Bickel's reference to "the wound" suggests that it may not be unduly pedantic to
enumerate the number of bullets with which we may be concerned, and to observe that
this number is by no means precisely correlated with the number of wounds which may
be significant. Every theory contemplates at least two bullets, the one that hit first and
the one that is thought to have caused all the final brain damage. In view of the now
quite generally recognized difficulties with the one shot-two hit hypothesis as to the
first bullet, there is coming to be a fairly widely held opinion that a minimum of three
shots is required to explain the events. A fourth shot may be indicated by the Parkland
doctors' first report of a wound of entry in the throat, not obviously inconsistent with
a fragment or bullet exit in the shirt front tear or the nick in the tie. A fifth shot has
not been referred to here, but it has enlisted the interest of some critical students. This
is a shot which may have left an identifiable mark on the pavement and may have been
connected with the experience reported by some witnesses with what may well have been
fragments of a spent bullet. If the difficulties in connecting the first bullet in this sequence-not Professor Bickel's first bullet-with the bullet found in the hospital seem
controlling, as they may well do, the bullet found in the hospital will be the sixth in our
list. There may well have been more. Not all the bullets are correlated with possible
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The original view was that Oswald fired three shots, the first wounding the President, the second wounding Connally, and the third killing
the President. The supposed presence of three shells of appropriate
make and caliber at the supposed place of the shooting, reported circumstantially by the Dallas police the following day, contributed to
this view of the shooting. Within the week following the assassination
this view was sharply challenged by persons familiar with the problems
of marksmanship involved, and it now appears to be most unlikely.
The matter is still a subject of dispute by those defending the Report
and those criticizing it. As far as a reader can judge, the critics have
much the best of the argument.
The official theory was saved from this difficulty, at the expense of
encountering more serious ones, by the moving picture film which
appears to be generally regarded as the best evidence in existence
about the timing of the hits wounding the President and Connally
and killing the President. The first hit to strike the President apparently occurred not more than 1.8 seconds before the hit which struck
Governor Connally, and the rifle in question cannot be operated that
fast by anyone. The result was the Commission's development of the
one shot-two hit hypothesis for this sequence. The hypothesis is that
the same shot hit the President high in the back, penetrated his throat,
struck Mr. Connally in the back, penetrated his chest, "tumbled"
into his wrist and lodged briefly in his thigh. Tests with simulated
objects establish that such a sequence was not physically impossible.
These tests are sometimes referred to, even by critical writers, as
though they contributed significantly to the theory that such a sequence was probable. They did so, however, only to the extent that
they showed it to be possible.
wounds, and wounds not correlated with bullets may well have resulted from fragments of
bullet or bone.
Professor Bickel makes other points, as do other students of the case. A review of the
present length cannot usefully even enumerate the various points made, and this review
does indeed exercise considerable selection. The reader is advised not to accept either this

review or any of the other relatively brief treatments of the subject, but to go to the
books themselves and to the Report. The reader is advised particularly to discount the
frustration which has been occasioned by Mr. Mark Lane's book, and to recall that Mr.
Lane spent more time and energy on this problem than any other man. The reader may
perhaps be encouraged by my own interest in Mr. Lane's book to consider the possibility
that it is the most careful single study we have. Oddly enough, I am not myself much
influenced by the introduction to the book written by the English historian, Mr. Hugh
Trevor-Roper. Mr. Trevor-Roper's appropriate approval of the book cannot be disassociated in my mind from what I regard as his inaccurate and prejudiced treatment of a
controversial book in his field, A.J.P. Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War.
Historians, including Professor Bickel, may be as easily misled as lawyers, including Professor Bickel and myself.
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The difficulties with the theory are four. First, Governor Connally
(like his wife) has said consistently that he thought the sequence just
did not occur. He remembers hearing the shot that hurt the President
and turning to look at the President before he was hit himself. It may
be that things happened too fast for his report to be accurate. Nevertheless, it should be observed at once that three out of the six Commissioners who discussed the matter together took Governor Connally's view of the facts. Senator Russell, Congressman Boggs, and
Senator Cooper all declined to be persuaded by the evidence in favor
of the one shot-two hit theory. Congressman Ford and Mr. Dulles were
persuaded, and it may be that Mr. McCloy was, as one writer says,
also persuaded. The quotation from an interview with him upon
which Mr. Epstein relies seems to me to indicate some doubt about
Mr. McCloy's position. At any rate Mr. McCloy suggested a form of
words on the subject to which all Commissioners, including the Chief
Justice, subscribed. If one reads the statement carefully, one will see
that it says nothing at all, except that the theory is a possible one.
Three lines of evidence in addition to Governor Connally's testimony raise serious doubts about the theory. The sequence of the
reports from doctors, including the notes of the doctors who first attended the President, followed by reports from FBI representatives
present at the autopsy conducted later, followed by the autopsy report
itself, appears to indicate that the physical evidence from the President's body is unintelligible. The Parkland Hospital doctors, who
established their competence to deal with the difference between ordinary wounds of entry and wounds of exit, all agreed at first that one
bullet entered the President's neck from the front. (This was not the
bullet that entered his brain and ultimately effected his death.) Operations designed to save the President were apparently such that they
have completely obliterated all characteristics of this wound. The first
report from the autopsy, made in two successive FBI reports, was that
the first bullet that hit the President penetrated his back rather
lightly, and was thought to be the bullet then thought to have been
found on his stretcher at the hospital, the relatively intact bullet.
These reports have since been discounted as coming from officers who
were simply onlookers at the autopsy. The autopsy report, whose first
appearance in circulation was some weeks after the FBI reports were
made, is quite different. It reports that a bullet entered the President's
back and went through him in a course which could be determined
only by dealing with the traces of metal which it supposedly left
behind. No simple path through the body was reported, a matter
which apparently by itself occasions some skepticism on the part of
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qualified persons. The autopsy pictures and X-rays were not made
available even to the staff of the Commission, and they are said to be
now in the United States Archives subject to controls, or limitations
on use, required by the Kennedy family. It was thought that Mr. Manchester might throw some light on them, but his second article in Look,
touching on the matter, fails to do so.
Another line of evidence said to raise difficulties with the one shottwo hit hypothesis is the evidence from the position of the shot as indicated by a bullet hole in the President's shirt. Unless the shirt was
pushed up in a somewhat unusual way, the hole is said to have been
too low to permit the bullet, which would have been in a downward
course, to exit from the point where it must have made its exit if it
was to account for Governor Connally's wound.
Another serious set of difficulties leads us back to the bullet. Some
of the tests made to establish the physical possibility of the one shot-two
hit theory were made in one case by firing bullets like the supposed
first bullet through material made to simulate President Kennedy's
neck, and in another case through an anesthetized goat, which, though
less thick than Governor Connally's chest, was used to indicate possible
rates of penetration of his chest. In the latter case the resulting bullet
was described as significantly flattened.3 It was therefore inferred in
the Report that this bullet was going somewhat faster than the supposed first bullet, which was significantly less flattened, or only slightly
deformed. (One would of course have to see the exhibits to know just
what these words mean.) As a result the lay reader wonders, first,
whether a bullet going at this lower rate would have satisfied the standards set by the tests; or, second, why the supposed first bullet was not
itself more flattened or deformed than it was. Moreover, a serious
doubt has been raised by some observers, who appear to be technically
qualified, whether the first bullet would not have shown some effect,
or some greater effect, from its loss of metal in colliding with Governor Connally's wrist and in leaving traces of metal in his thigh.
The difficulties with the one shot-two hit theory thus increase the
difficulties originally suggested about the identity of the bullet found
at the Parkland Hospital.
3 The report of tests used with material simulating the President's neck may be read
as indicating the likelihood of distortion or flattening in the case of a bullet fired through
the neck only. The trajectory of even a hard bullet was found to be changed in the process, and the silence of Report and Record on the condition of the bullet used in testing
leaves the total account ambiguous.
It may be noticed further that a test bullet used in a simulation of the supposed impact of the first bullet on Governor Connally's wrist was more flattened than the supposed first bullet itself.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:453

The gun, bullet, and shot evidence appears to this reader to be the
only significant evidence in the Report. The eyewitness testimony purporting to identify Oswald at the time of the shooting seems to be undependable. The principal identification testimony about the killing
of the policeman seems to be worthless. All of Marina Oswald's testimony perhaps should have been excluded from the Report. The inclusion of all these items may have unfairly diminished the credibility of
the Report.
A word perhaps should be said about the murder of the policeman.
In addition to the eyewitness testimony about which we have spoken,
a number of other witnesses placed Oswald near the scene of the
shooting with a revolver. The circumstances of this testimony, and
particularly the condition under which identifications were made,
seem to deprive all of these witnesses of any credibility whatever. 4
Four shells of a make and caliber which are said to have been suitable for the revolver said to have been found on Oswald when he was
arrested were found in positions near the scene of the shooting. At
first picked up by witnesses at the time of the shooting, they were, however, apparently not properly marked, or if marked were replaced.
Thus, their identification later by Dallas police force members was
not such as would qualify them for serious use in a carefully conducted
murder trial.5 The one bullet furnished promptly by the Dallas police
was too mutilated for test purposes, and the three bullets furnished by
them somewhat later did not fit the gun exactly, though they could
have been fired from it. The result was that aside from one sharply
4 The identification-but not eyewitness-testimony of Callaway is somewhat reassuring, and M. Sauvage speaks well of him. Nevertheless, the testimony of Guinyard, who
was with him, discloses the confusion of the circumstances in which Callaway first saw
the man he was to identify. Callaway's account of the line-up (conducted the day of the
assassination) at which he picked Oswald gives a more favorable account of this line-up
than the accounts given of other line-ups. Yet, as M. Sauvage has observed, Oswald's face
was by then bruised, and he may well have stood out in other ways from the other three
men in the line-up, who are not described specifically. Guinyard indeed says they were
not all of the same color, and that he saw the same line-up as Callaway; but there may
have been a misunderstanding on this point.
5 It is difficult to take seriously the treatment of the two shells said to have been
picked up, one by Jeannette Davis and one by Virginia Davis. Neither finder could later
identify either shell. In each of two statements purporting to record FBI conversations
with the two Dallas police officers to each of whom one shell is said to have been given,
it is said that the police officer recognized "his marking," not otherwise specified or described, on the shell in question. The discussion of the problems about the other two
shells indicates that Dallas police officers knew that something more specific about the
markings was to be expected. The two FBI memoranda on the supposed Davis shells
were undated, unsigned, and unverified, as well as unspecific. They were not testified to,
and their condition was not mentioned in the Report.
Like some of the items referred to in note 1 supra, the jacket evidence seems to me inconclusive, but it may perhaps seem persuasive to others.
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questioned stronger statement about one bullet, the experts said in this
case they could testify only that the bullets could have come from the
revolver, not that they must have done so.
It may appear that the condition of some of the evidence about the
murder of the policeman suggests an absence of planning and consequently a degree of reliability in the evidence about the assassination
of the President. Reflection will indicate a number of explanations for
the situation which leave the suggestion inconclusive. For example, a
second individual or group participating in the assassination might
well have decided to show caution, and not to go too far, in manipulating evidence about the murder.
The circumstances of the arrest in the theater were such that no
mutually consistent accounts of it have been given. It should be noticed
that even if it had been clearly shown that Oswald had murdered the
policeman, this would have had only a problematical bearing on the
assassination of the President. The most that the evidence of Oswald's
conduct after the shooting can have shown is some kind of "consciousness of guilt" or, better, consciousness of risk of accusation. The New
York Court of Appeals, among other courts, has shown an acute awareness of the undependability of this sort of evidence.
As the reader of these observations will have observed, the differences between a trial and the deliberations of the Commission and its
staff are striking. The defendant Oswald was dead and in no position,
like the ordinary murder defendant, to help his counsel frame a defense or, if he chose, to testify on his own behalf. Every once in a while
even a lawyer critic of the Commission observes that some particular
testimony that he has considered is hearsay. But this is conceding too
much, for everything in the Report is hearsay. It was, that is, not subject to the test of adverse cross-examination.
I have tried to use what seems to me the critical evidence as though
it stood by itself, neither helped nor shaken by cross-examination. (It
is impossible to make any life-like assumption of this sort about any
of the identification testimony or any of the evidence connected with
the murder of the policeman.) On this relatively unrealistic assumption
about the gun, bullet and first shot evidence, I have come to the conclusion that as presently advised I would not vote as a juryman for
conviction.6 There is, of course, a significant burden of proof for the
prosecution in a murder case.
6 The reader will notice at once that it is impossible to come very close to acting as
a hypothetical juryman. Observations throughout this review, including those in the preceding footnotes, are a constant reminder of the limited significance of what is here said.
For my views on the burden of proof appropriate for capital cases or cases which carry
more than ten year sentences, see Book Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 560 (1958).
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The Report is history, and its present significance is primarily political and not legal. The Commission and its staff were indeed composed entirely of lawyers, and the Report is in this respect an interesting legal phenomenon. It must be said, however, that the Commission
was quite aware of the limitations of its procedures, though its interest
in quieting anxiety and rumors may have led it to understate these
limitations.
Now that we have looked at the limitations of the proof, we may
turn for a while to the political aspects of the Report.
Two of the members of the Commission and two of its staff are
among those contemporary lawyers for whom I have the highest possible respect. One is the Chief Justice, who by his record in dealing
with race relations, with crime, and with the legal remnants of the
McCarthy period has qualified himself in my judgment as the greatest
Justice in the history of the Court. The second is Mr. John McCloy,
a schoolmate of the reviewer both in college and in law school, and an
eminent and level-headed public servant. The next is Mr. Lee Rankin,
general counsel for the Commission, who showed heartening independence in confessing error in the Mesarosh (Pennsylvania secondary
leader Smith Act) case, and thereby beginning a tide which-as it
turned out-led eventually to the dismissal of all the pending Smith
Act cases except the Scales case, involving in the dismissals well over a
hundred defendants. The fourth is Mr. Albert Jenner of the Chicago
Bar, for whom every member of the Chicago faculty and every member
of the Bar must feel the highest respect.
Moreover, the immediate constructive accomplishments of the Commission are much better than the critics of the Report appreciate. My
first impression was that the shooting of the President and the accusation of someone associated, however vaguely, with Communist groups
threatened us with a revival of overexcitement about the domestic
Communist threat. The official theory within a week had alleviated my
concern on this subject, and the official theory was in turn strengthened in its effects by the Commission and its staff. At the same time
the official theory first and the Commission later legitimately ameliorated the tendency to find Dallas as a community guilty of the offense.
Some Dallas citizens had indeed brought discredit on the city by their
treatment of Mr. Adlai Stevenson not long before the President's visit.
Moreover, the record of the Dallas police in the events surrounding the
President's assassination is such, in my judgment, as to deprive them of
any claim to respect. General Walker lived in Dallas. Nevertheless,
Dallas is a city of some standing, and Texas is as far from Mississippi
and Alabama in its attitude toward Negroes as any state in the South.

1967]

Book Reviews

The Commission had a serious psychological problem with which it
had to deal. Moreover, by the time the Commission's deliberations
began there was a body of critical writing, beginning with the newspapers from the time of the assassination on and culminating in two
or three systematic criticisms of the official doctrine, which gave the
Commission something to answer. Some of the critical writing originated abroad, and much of it was received abroad with uncritical acceptance and with prejudice to the reputation of the United States. Mr.
McCloy was quoted as saying that the Commission had to see to it
that this country was not thought of as a "banana republic."
The Commission would have been on more solid ground if it had
made fewer claims. On the basis of the evidence thus far reviewed at
any rate, it could have said that the only evidence that it had, however
problematical it might be, pointed toward Oswald; and that the evidence indicating participation by anyone else gave no dependable clue
to the identity of any other participant or participants. The Commission might indeed have observed that it would have found difficulty in
naming other participants under any circumstances. The Commission
not only was not a court; it was also not a grand jury. We do not in
fact know what encouragement it may have quietly given to police
officers, including the FBI, to pursue leads which the critics are now
calling to our attention. If the Commission had taken some such position, its record would look better now, but it might have been less
effective in quieting anxieties and relieving guilts and hostilities.
What standing the Commission's Report has as history I must leave
to the historians. The reputation of Pericles is perhaps not quite as
good as the histories would have us think, and in the end the standings
of Cleon and Alcibiades were surely better than the histories generally
say. Otto of Brunswick, for reasons which were not plainly discreditable
to him, incurred the animosity of Hildebrandine Popes and Hohenstaufen Emperors alike, and there is no reason to trust their account
of his villainy. It is as likely as not that Richard III, otherwise a good
king, was traduced in the matter of the princes by both Sir Thomas
More and Shakespeare. Among the events which I have witnessed, I can
think of none which has been subject to greater misrepresentation than
the history of the NRA in Mr. Schlesinger's account of the New Deal.
History may well be made up, in part at least, of hypotheses which are
simply less improbable than defined competing hypotheses. Perhaps
the historian will want to say something positive about the assassination of the President. It might be better, however, for him to say that
not enough is known about the perpetrator or perpetrators to warrant
a conclusion.
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The question naturally arises as to whether something should be
done about it. We have thus far conducted our discussion of the assassination on the basis of testimony about which the three books ostensibly
under review are in rather close agreement. M. Sauvage, a conservative correspondent-of the conservative Figaro,was from an early time
in Dallas among the many skeptical newspapermen, American and European, who-following the best traditions of their profession-refused
to accept the official account uncritically. Beyond those of which we
have spoken, his account adds a number of criticisms of the official
theory. Unfortunately, his book becomes somewhat querulous as it
proceeds, and he greatly underestimates the contribution made by Mr.
Buchanan before the Report in the central or major hard-headed portions of Mr. Buchanan's book. He does not indeed fully appreciate the
extent to which he is indebted to a number of other journalists, including, for example, Mr. Joesten, whose work has been to some extent
answered by the Commission, but whose doubts have contributed to
those healthy doubts which currently survive.
Mr. Epstein has specialized in his brief but very thoughtful book on
the difficulties with the one shot-two hit hypothesis. He has also given
us an excellent clue to the interplay of personalities and the actions
and proceedings of the Commission and its staff.
The American reviews that first appeared, mostly defending the
Commission, seem to me to have concentrated attention on minor defects in these books, admitting in a somewhat concealed way the force
of the principal points which they make. The same observation applies
to a published interview by Mr. Specter, a staff member. My treatment
of the evidence so far has been based on the Report and on these two
books primarily, though at points I have added observations drawn
from Mr. Lane's book.
Mr. Lane's book has also been subjected to criticism and even vituperation, and it goes much beyond the other two books in its criticism
of the Report. What I have already said indicates that I am disposed
to discount heavily the somewhat personal criticisms of the Commission and its staff which appear in all three books. But as a reader, not
as a juryman who might have looked at exhibits, witnesses, and other
evidence, I cannot find any flaws at all in the substance of Mr. Lane's
book.7 The discussion thus far indicates that in the view of the most
7 Since November 5, when the body of this essay was written, there has been a growing
volume of intelligent discussion of the problems raised by the Report. This discussion
appears to have created in the minds of the public a proper amount of reasonable and
healthy skepticism about the conclusion that Oswald shot the President, or about the
conclusion that he was the only one who shot the President. Mr. Lane has contributed
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sober critics, and indeed perhaps in the view of a majority of the Commission itself, the difficulties with the one shot-two hit theory make it
necessary to suppose one other participant in the shooting besides Oswald. The discussion thus far leaves his identity a complete mystery,
and perhaps it must remain so. But once this possibility is admitted, as
Mr. Epstein observes, it opens a "Pandora's box" of possibilities-possibilities which are indeed hypothetical, but of which some may be
little more improbable than the official account itself.
Mr. Lane is still convinced that many of the criticisms of the official
theory made by others as well as himself before the appearance of the
Report, and not repeated by the other two authors, are valid. In particular, he makes a most impressive case for the view that testimony of
many persons along the route of President Kennedy at the time of the
assassination strongly supports the view that some, if not all the shots,
came from a "grassy knoll," or near it, to the right of the procession.
Mr. Lane recalls with emphasis the first reports of the doctors at the
Parkland Hospital that the first wound of entry was at the front of the
President's neck. He adds an account of witnesses ready to testify that
the impact of the second bullet on the President's brain was such that
it appeared to come from the right and not from behind as the official
theory of Oswald's part in the assassination requires. Mr. Lane with
great force calls attention again to some features of the immediate and
quick pursuit of Oswald which suggest that there was some preparation for casting him in the part of assassin. M. Sauvage suggests that
Ruby may have had reasons for shooting Oswald apart from the not
more than any other person to this healthy doubt, but on these issues he has been helped
by the course of journalistic criticism from the time of assassination to the present, including the publication of M. Sauvage's book. The level-headed criticism of the first one
shot-two hit hypothesis by Mr. Epstein and Governor Connally seems to Mr. Lane, and
to me, to have implications going beyond those which some of the critics recognize.
Nevertheless, the problem of Oswald's guilt and the related problem of a second possible
or probable assassin seem now to appear to the public in a rational perspective.
Mr. Lane goes far beyond the other critics in the detail and the vigor of his criticism
of the one assassin theory, and more particularly in his insistence that further investigation might well lead to the discovery of the identities of a number of participants in the
assassination and its planning. In particular, as Professor Trevor-Roper observed with emphasis, steps might well have been taken to question Mr. Ruby under circumstances in
which he would have been free from any possible influence from the Dallas police. Mr.
Ruby's mental condition might have furnished him a legal defense to the charge of murdering Oswald and may evoke sympathy from the detached observer. His illness would
have tended to correct any distortions which might otherwise have resulted from hope
of clemency. It may be that he had dues to an alternative explanation of the assassination which should not have been neglected. The issues of the case should not be obscured by the hostilities resulting from Mr. Lane's courage and pertinacity, or by the
vigorous and sometimes understandably hostile tone of some of his observations.
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very probable view that these sketchy characters were involved together
in a conspiracy. M. Sauvage suggests that it must have been clear to
Ruby that his friends on the Dallas police force were somewhat dismayed by the prospect of a trial for Oswald, and he recounts an exchange between Ruby and one of his lawyers which suggests that the
lawyer had this view as well.
Mr. Lane suggests another hypothesis about Ruby and also about
the casting of Oswald. He recognizes that his principal witness on the
subject, a somewhat strange lady, may be unreliable and has not been
subject to cross-examination. But he says it is a story that so far as it
goes should be investigated, and I agree with him. This lady places
Ruby in the gun running business to either Castro or anti-Castro
magnates. Mr. Lane leaves it there, but one suggestion that might be
examined is the suggestion that anti-Castro magnates engaged Ruby
and doubtless others to see to it that Oswald, identified with Castro,
should be charged with the murder of the President, who at this particular time at any rate was showing a cautious attitude toward future
exploits in Cuba.
Questions about the case, and reflections about its significance occur
in profusion. Why is it necessary to have some of the evidence impounded, as it seems to be, until all contemporaries are dead, and other
portions restricted in use? The alertness with which the official theory
was adopted and proclaimed may be explained by the need for quieting
apprehensions or by political motives, but one wonders again whether
this quick reaction had something to do with whatever reasons require
the impounding and restricting of evidence.
Some of the alternative explanations for the assassination first suggested.by critics seemed even then preposterous. Cosa Nostra, like the
Teamsters and the really great Texas oil millionaires, seems at once
too strong and too cold-blooded to resort to such devices. Mr. Buchanan's hypothesis about the social and class significance of the assassination was indeed most unpersuasive. The crackpot left or the crackpot
right or both seem still the most likely sources of the trouble. Presumably the police, including the FBI, are alert for danger from either
crackpot left or crackpot right.
Why should citizens and students of law concern themselves further?
Mr. Lane has one answer, and that is that it is a question of juitice.
Whether it is Richard III or Oswald, a man's reputation after death,
the meaning of his life for others, is a matter of concern, however difficult it may be to devise means of protecting it legally.
Another reason for our interest is our concern for accuracy in statements from the government. However well intentioned, a very large
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number of official statements about Vietnam have led to a state of what
seems to me legitimate skepticism on the part of the public. Did the
various security forces involved mislead the Warren Commission? Did
the immense and expensive apparatus of foreign intelligence somehow
mislead Secretary McNamara into his manifestly erroneous estimates
of the costs of Vietnam? Is our foreign policy now influenced by computer or other inadequacies in estimating hazards as well as simple
costs?
These are related questions, and they may lead the observer to hope
for future study of the problems created by the assassination of President Kennedy and the Report of the Warren Commission.
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The Zoning Game: Municipal Practices and Policies. RecARD F.
BABCOCK. University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 202. $5.75.

Mr. Babcock begins his book with a description of how the zoning
game was and is now played. Next he describes the players-the layman
as public and private decision-maker, the planner, the lawyer, the
judge. They turn out, by and large, to be weak nonheros. Mr. Babcock
then criticizes the purposes and principles of the game. The backers of
the sport, who bet heavily on the players, are such interested parties
as the landowner, the neighbor, the municipality, the metropolitan
area. He concludes with recommendations on rule changes.
Mr. Babcock is entitled to write this book, he says, because he has
written a law review article on zoning with 310 footnotes. He is also
the pre-eminent land use planning and controls lawyer in private practice. He is a lawyer's lawyer; a planner's confidant; and, due to his interest in the esoteric, an academician's delight. The Zoning Game adds
to Mr. Babcock's stature.
The book is witty, honest, and free from planners' and lawyers' jargon and euphemisms. The real world of zoning comes through. Not
having read the book, most lawyers would not know, for example, why
motels are excluded from zones in which hotels are permitted, or why
it is easier to get a rezoning for a supermarket than for a discount
store. He makes frequent use of the first person, without becoming

